

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/NE/DO		X		
17					
18					
19					
20					
21					
22					
		SUSPENSE _____ Date _____			

Remarks

STAT

Executive Secretary
30 May 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


Executive Registry

85- 2177

30 May 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, NE Division, DO
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

The attached INR analysis on
Afghanistan: The Resistance Alliance
will interest you if you haven't seen
it.


William J. Casey

Attachment a/s



17-367

BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH - ANALYSIS - MAY 30, 1985

1. AFGHANISTAN: THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE

The leaders of all seven major Afghan resistance parties announced an agreement on May 16 to form a new "united front," primarily to improve the "international dimensions" of the resistance. Although we are skeptical of the ability of the Peshawar-based party leadership to overcome its endemic factionalism and do not anticipate much military impact, we do expect to see a higher Afghan profile on the world stage.

The alliance. According to a joint statement, the parties will retain their individual identities but have a common spokesman directed by a council of the leaders. The coalition will move to establish ties to international organizations. No specifics were given on military coordination, prospects for a government-in-exile, or a role for former king Zahir Shah.

The genesis. Maneuvering to develop more effective unity has intensified since the beginning of the year. "Fundamentalist" alliance chairman Abdul Rasul Sayyaf was accused of stealing adherents from other leaders by abusing his position as the channel of Saudi funds. The Saudis tried to get the parties to unify under Sayyaf, but he apparently undermined his own credibility: while most party leaders were busy condemning the illegitimate tribal assembly staged in late April in Kabul, Sayyaf gathered some party defectors and had himself reelected chairman. The other leaders immediately disavowed the action and publicly blamed Sayyaf's Saudi patrons for the coup.

Barely a week later Prince Turki, head of Saudi intelligence, flew to Islamabad. According to the Pakistanis, party leaders were called in by intelligence chief General Akhtar, Pakistani liaison with the resistance. Akhtar and Turki told them that Saudi contributions would now be disbursed directly by the Saudis, on the basis of amounts suggested by Akhtar.

Uncertain prospects. The individual parties will receive increased funding; the divisive Sayyaf has clearly been reined in; and the alliance will reduce confusion among outside supporters about the differences between "fundamentalists" and "moderates" and their visions for a post-Soviet Afghanistan. The Pakistanis have already begun holding military meetings.

True unity will be more elusive. The need for unanimity will ensure that alliance decisions will be few and difficult to achieve. Foreign (including US) support is essential. Pakistan will continue to try to increase its control of the cash flow, and of the resistance. The Saudis are likely to continue to pursue their own agenda. An international voice for the resistance will nonetheless be a major step forward.

~~SECRET/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON/EXDIS~~